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guishes it from a definable term. The author works out for the bene-
fit of his pupils a number of well-known principles underlying scien-
tific discovery and the definition of concepts.
HOWARD C. WARREN.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY .
Pensare senza coscicnza. G. SERGI. (Reprinted.) La Rivista
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This is an amplification and in some respects an advance on the
author's doctrine of the unconscious, as developed in his Psychologie
physiologique. Professor Sergi starts out with the view that conscious
thought is merely the last term in a series of unconscious brain states.
In support of this theory he cites, from his own experience and others',
numerous examples in which a problem has been solved or a train of
reasoning worked out to a conclusion while the mind was occupied
with something entirely different. In some instances the process ex-
tended over an hour, in others over a day, week, month or more. In
his own case he finds many instances of this unconscious brain work
proceeding during sleep ; at one time it was so pronounced that he grew
accustomed to read up the theme of any paper he was to write, and
then immediately dismiss the whole question from his mind, without
working out the plan of the paper; in the morning he would begin the
writing at once with no hesitation or difficult}', the subject having
apparently been analyzed and arranged for treatment during the night.
Professor Sergi reviews the theories of Kant, Leibnitz, Hamilton,
J. S. Mill and Carpenter, on obscure ideas, subconsciousness and un-
conscious cerebration. He gives preference to Hamilton's view, that
' latent agencies—modifications of which we are unconscious—must
be admitted as a groundwork of Phenomenology of Mind.' The
author, however, goes further, holding that this "unconscious cerebral
and physiological work constitutes the whole phenomenon, not merely
one side of it, and that the consciousness of the phenomenon is merely
its superficial revelation, which adds nothing to the essence and com-
pleteness of the phenomenon in question." He claims to solve the
problem of psychological dualism, by making the physiological pro-
cess the sole 'essence' and the state of consciousness a mere 'mani-
festation'. In spite of the brevity of the paper and the lack of novelty
in its standpoint, it calls for attention on account or the new ob-
servational data which the author has brought forward.
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